Income Taxation - Problems of Multiple Corporations by King, C. A., II
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 20 | Number 4
June 1960
Income Taxation - Problems of Multiple
Corporations
C. A. King II
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
C. A. King II, Income Taxation - Problems of Multiple Corporations, 20 La. L. Rev. (1960)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol20/iss4/14
NOTES
INCOME TAXATION - PROBLEMS OF MULTIPLE CORPORATIONS
Two recent cases focus attention on some of the tax problems
of multiple corporations. In the first case the corporate taxpayer
brought an action to recover an alleged overpayment of income
taxes which were paid after disallowance of its corporate surtax
exemption and minimum excess profits credit. The taxpayer and
eight other corporations had been formed "to acquire, improve,
and develop real property." The individual who controlled these
corporations had previously formed two others, one to construct
houses on land transferred to the taxpayer and the other to sell
the homes after they were constructed. The Tax Commissioner
disallowed the corporate surtax exemption and excess credit by
application of Section 129 (a) (1) (Section 269 of the 1954
Code) 1 which authorizes a disallowance of any "deduction, credit
or other allowance" resulting from acquisition of control of a
corporation, when the principal purpose of such acquisition is
avoidance of income taxes. The taxpayer made two contentions:
(1) that Section 269 is applicable only to acquisition of corpora-
tions, and not to their creation, and (2) that this section is au-
thority for denying deductions and credits only to acquiring cor-
porations, and not to the corporation which has been acquired.
The federal district court held for the commissioner. Section 269
is applicable to either acquisition or creation of corporations and
to acquiring as well as acquired corporations. The principal pur-
pose for creating the corporation being tax avoidance, the section
was properly applied. James Realty Company v. United States,
176 F. Supp. 306 (D. Minn. 1959).
In the ,second case the corporate taxpayer was organized for
the purpose of acquiring property, executing loans and having
houses built. Its total authorized capital stock was purchased
by three individuals designated as the management group. Im-
mediately thereafter a group designated as the investors ad-
vanced funds to the taxpayer in the form of a loan, which was
used to acquire a tract of land. Subsequently sixteen corpora-
tions, designated as the alphabet corporations, were formed by
the management group, and the taxpayer transferred its land to
these corporations in return for their unsecured notes. After
the tract was completely developed the management and invest-
ment groups effected an equal division of the profits from devel-
opment of the tract by liquidation of all the corporations in-
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 269, formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 129(a)(1). • . -"
1960]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
volved. The commissioner made a deficiency assessment against
the taxpayer, disregarding all of the alphabet corporations as
"shams" and imputing their total net income to the taxpayer
under Section 22(a) (Section 61 of the 1954 Code) 2 which con-
tains a general definition of gross income. Alternatively the
assessment was based upon Section 45 (Section 482 of the 1954
Code) 3 which authorizes a redistribution of income between cor-
porations controlled by the same interests. The commissioner
also disallowed the surtax exemption to each of the alphabet
corporations, one of which filed a petition in the Tax Court
simultaneously with the taxpayer. The Tax Court consolidated
the cases and held for the commissioner. Where a group. of cor-
porations are formed solely for the purpose of tax avoidance and
thereafter engage in no substantial business activity, they will be
disregarded as "unreal" or "shams." The entire net income from
the development of the tract is properly includible in the gross
income of the taxpayer. Aldon Homes Inc. v. Commissioner;.
Barca Corporation v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 65 (1959).
As a general rule corporations are taxed as separate entities. 4
Early in the history of corporate taxation, the commissioner be-
gan to attack the standing of certain corporations as separate
taxable entities by application of Section 22(a) (Section 61 of
the 1954 Code) which defines gross income. 5 The theory behind
the attacks was that income should be attributed to the person
or corporation who actually earned it. Therefore, if it is found
that a certain block of income was earned by an individual but
included in the gross income of a corporation, the substance
rather than the form would be controlling and the income would
be included in the gross income of the individual. Section 45
(Section 482 of the 1954 Code) 7 was enacted to aid the commis-
sioner in attacks on multiple corporations by authorizing redis-
2. Id. § 61, formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(a).
3. Id. § 482, formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 45.
4. C.I.R. v. Moline Properties, Inc., 319 U.S: 436 (1943) ; Burnet v. Common-
wealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932) ; Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U.S. 404
(1932) ; C.I.R. v. Montgomery, 144 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1944) ; Glenn v. Courier-
Journal Job Printing, 127 F.2d 820 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Page v. Haverty, 129 F.2d
512 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Menihan v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1935). INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 11, provides for taxation of corporations; subsection (b)
imposes a 30% normal tax on corporate income, this to be reduced to 25% begin-
ning June 30, 1960; subsection (c) imposes a surtax of 22% on all taxable income
in excess of $25,000.
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61: "Except as otherwise provided in this sub-
title, gross income means all income from whatever source derived. .. ."
6. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940) ; Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935).
7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 482, formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 45.
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tribution of income between related corporations in order to
* more clearly reflect income actually earned by each. Believing
that further powers were required to deal with multiple cor-
porations, Congress supplied the commissioner with two addi-
tional weapons. The first was Section 129 (Section 269 of the
1954 Code) ,8 which was aimed at acquisition of corporations by
either individuals or other corporations whose principal purpose
was tax avoidance. To supplement this section, Section 15(c)
(Section 1551 of the 1954 Code) 9 was enacted to authorize the
commissioner to disallow the surtax exemption to transferee cor-
porations when the major purpose of the transfer of property
was tax avoidance. Each of these sections will be discussed
individually.
The present Section 61 was originally enacted merely as a
general definition of what must be included in an individual's
gross income, with no reference to corporations. However, the
commissioner soon began using it to redistribute corporate in-
come. The jurisprudence under this section seems to have de-
veloped the rule that the commissioner must show that the sole
purpose for the formation of the corporation was tax avoidance
and that the corporation has carried on no business which pro-
duced income. 10 Therefore, if the taxpayer can prove that the
corporation was either organized for some business purpose or
thereafter has carried on some business, Section 61 will be in-
applicable. Some of the business purposes which have been al-
lowed to defeat application of this section are to avoid unlimited
liability," to gain advantage under the law of the state of incor-
poration,12 to secure a loan, 13 and to protect a building from at-
tachment. 4 Section 48215 was enacted to authorize the commis-
sioner to "distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deduc-
8. Id. § 269, formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 129(a) (1).
9. Id. § 1551, formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 15(c).
10. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Sanford
Corp. v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 659 (1940); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473(1940); Rota-Cone Oil Field Operating Co. v. C.I.R., 171 F.2d 219 (10th Cir.
1948) ; National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Common-
wealth Title Co. of Philadelphia v. Rothensies, 124 F. Supp. 274 (Pa. 1954);
Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369 (Cal. 1952). See also Marshall, Income
Status of the Wholly Owned Subsidiary Cbrporation, 29 TEX. L. REV. 87 (1950) ;
Holzmay, Moline Properties Inc., May the Taxpayer Ignore the Corporate Equity,
26 TAXES 858 (1948) ; Cleary, The Corporate Entity in Tax Cases, 1 TAX L. REV.
3 (1945).
11. Commissioner v. Chelsea Products Inc., 187 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952).
12. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1942).
13. Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945).
14. Sheldon Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1941).
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 482. See also National Securities Corp. v.
C.I.R., 137 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1944).
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tions, credit or allowances" between owned or controlled entities
if he finds it necessary in order to more clearly reflect actual
income. Thus, although the taxpayer could establish some busi-
ness purpose, the commissioner might still reallocate income. In
the majority of cases, however, the taxpayer has been able to
avoid the application of this section by showing that the trans-
actions were made at arms' length and therefore were trans-
actions generally found in the ordinary course of business with
no special advantage being given to the related corporation. 6 It
has also been held that Section 482 does not authorize the disal-
lowance of "deductions, credits, or allowances" but merely a re-
distribution thereof. 17 It would seem that both sections, 61 and
482, are applicable only where related corporations have indis-
criminately distributed income among themselves in order to se-
cure tax benefits.'
8
The next two sections of the Code used by the commissioner
to attack affiliated corporations deal with acquiring or trans-
ferring property to secure tax benefits. Section 26919 deals with
the acquisition of corporations or other property for the prin-
cipal purpose of securing tax benefits not otherwise available.
The regulations indicate that this section was designed to pre-
vent acquisition of corporations or property in order to take ad-
vantage of loss carry-overs and to prevent corporate division
motivated principally by a desire to obtain surtax exemptions.
Thus, if the principal purpose of the acquisitions is tax avoid-
ance, Section 269 is applicable. 20 Among the purposes accepted
as principal purposes by the courts have been limited tort liabil-
ity,21 local ownership avoiding prejudice, 22 better bargaining
16. Ross v. C.I.R., 129 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1942); Trippett v. C.I.R., 118 F.2d
764 (5th Cir. 1941); Friedlander Corp. v. C.I.R, 25 T.C. 70 (1955) Texsun
Supply Corp. v. C.I.R., 17 T.C. 433 (1951) ; Cedar Valley Distillery Inc. v. C.I.R.,
16 T.C. 870 (1951). It seems that the court will be most likely to find that the
transaction was made at arms length if a sufficient price is paid and such trans-'
actions are found in the ordinary course of business between unrelated interests.
17. Hypotheek Land Co. v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1952)
Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1952) ; C.L.R. v.
Chelsea Products, 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co.
v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940).
18. Advance Machinery Exchange Inc. v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.
1952); Birmingham Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Davis, 112 F.2d 453 (5th .Cir.
1940).
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 269.
20. Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1959) ; American
Pipe and Steel Corp. v. C.I.R., 25 T.C. 351 (1955).
21. Alcorn Wholesale Co., 16 T.C. 75 (1951).
22. Commissioner v. Chelsea Products, 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952).
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power, 23 increased borrowing capacity,24 and clarification of tax
position. 25 The Tax Court 26 and the courts of appeal2 7 have given
different interpretations to Section 269, with the Tax Court hold-
ing that it applies both to the acquiring and the acquired cor-
porations. Further, until recent decisions it was felt that the
section applied only to the acquisition of corporations and did
not extend to formation of corporations. Recent cases, however,
have held that the section applies to both situations. 28 As a re-
sult of the commissioner's unsuccessful attempts to apply this
section, Section 155129 was enacted providing for disallowance
of the surtax exemption and accumulated earnings credit (1) if
one corporation transfers all or part of its property, other than
money to another corporation, (2) the transferee either was cre-
ated for the purpose of acquiring such property or was not ac-
tively engaged in business at the time of the transfer, and (3)
after such transfer the transferor was in control of the trans-
feree during any part of the transferee's taxable year. After a
showing of these conditions, the commissioner is authorized by
this section to disallow the surtax exemption and accumulated
earnings credit, unless the transferee can avoid application of
the section by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that a major purpose of such transfer was not the securing of
such exemption or credit.8 0 Within this limited area Section 1551
is more valuable to the commisisoner because the taxpayer, in
order to avoid its application, must prove that tax avoidance was
not even a major purpose as opposed to his burden merely to
establish that tax avoidance was not the principal purpose under
Section 269.
It can be seen that the commissioner has a variety of means
for attacking multiple corporate structures and generally, as
illustrated by the two instant cases, will attempt an application
of several of the above discussed rules and sections to the same
case. In James Realty Co. v. United States the district court
recognized the conflict of decisions between the Tax Court and
23. Berland's Inc. of South Bend, 16 T.C. 182 (1951).
24. Alcorn Wholesale Co., 16 T.C. 75 (1951).
25. J. E. Dilworth Co. v. Henslee, 98 F. Supp. 957 (M.D. Tenn. 1951).
26. British Motor Car Distributors Ltd. v. C.I.R., 31 T.C. 437 (1958) ; Ter-
minal Corp. v. C.I.R., 11 T.C. 411 (1948) ; Alprosa Watch Corp. v. C.I.R., 11 T.C.
240 (1948).
27. Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1959); Coastal
Oil Storage Co. v. Commisioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957).
28. Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957)
Alcorn Wholesale Co., 16 T.C. 75 (1951).
29. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1551, formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 15(c).
30. 7bid.
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courts of appeal and chose to adopt the rule of the latter by hold-
ing Section 269 applicable to both acquiring and acquired cor-
porations.31 The James case is supported by at least one pre-
vious court of appeals case in its holding that Section 269 is ap-
plicable to the formation as well as acquisition of corporations. 3
2
In Aldon Homes v. Commissioner the commissioner relied mainly
on his original weapon against multiple corporations by alleging
that all the subsidiaries were merely "shams" organized solely
for the purpose of tax avoidance. Therefore all of the income
was included in the gross income of the taxpayer as the real en-
tity creating the income under Section 61. Although the tax-
payer alleged several business purposes which in prior decisions
have been held to be sufficient, the court based its decision not
on the fact that these were not sufficient business purposes but
rather on the finding that they were not the true reasons for
establishment of the subsidiaries. It would seem that this should
be taken as a warning that the court will require more actual
proof of the subjective business purpose than has been required
in earlier cases, resulting in more frequent applications of both
Section 61 and Section 269. In refusing to rule on the applicabil-
ity of the other sections urged by the commissioner the court
aligned itself with prior decisions which indicated that those sec-
tions were meant to apply only to certain specified cases in which
the general rule of "sham" corporations could not be applied. By
refusing to base its decision on more than one section the court
seems to be attempting to indicate the specific situations to
31. It would seem that the Supreme Court will eventually have to rule on
this question in order that a uniform interpretation can be accomplished. The
first case to hold that Section 269 is applicable to the acquired corporation was
Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957). Even in
this case the court stated that the sole benefit of the surtax exemption would
accrue to the parent or acquiring corporation. A strict interpretation of the
language would seem to support the Tax Court decisions as the statute says:
"If any person or persons acquire, . . . control of a corporation, . . . and the
principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of
Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit or other allow-
ance which such person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy .... ." It is
true, however, that this strict interpretation severely limits the applicability of the
section. Section 1551 to some degree fills the gap, but it only authorizes the dis-
allowance of the surtax exemption and accumulated earnings credit; thus a cor-
poration could transfer property to another corporation with a loss carry over
and use that loss carry over to offset income from the transferred property. Sec-
tion 1551 offers no authority to the commissioner for disallowing this loss carry
over. Also, Section 269 requires only 50% control, whereas Section 1551 requires
80% control; therefore many transactions will escape Section 1551 which might
have been covered by the broader interpretation of 269 offered by the courts of
appeal. See Kirkpatrick, Section 269 of the 1954 Code-Its Present and Pros-
pective Function in the Commissioner's Arsenal, 15 TAX L. REV. 137 (1960);
Landman, Being Tax-Wise and Otherwise in Multiplying Business Entities, 30
TAx S 893 (1952).
32. Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957).
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which each section will be applicable. It would seem inconsistent
first to disregard a group of corporations as "unreal" and then
apply a section of the code which authorizes attacks on "real"
corporations. To the extent that the Aldon decision avoids this
inconsistency, it appears to be sound.
C. A. King II
LABOR LAW - THE EFFECT GIVEN TO AN ARBITRATION AWARD BY
THE NLRB IN AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE HEARING
Under the National Labor Relations Act as amended a prob-
lem exists where an arbitration award deals with the subject
matter of conduct which may be an unfair labor practice. It is
clear that the Board can entertain jurisdiction when an arbi-
tration award is interposed as a bar to an unfair labor practice
proceeding. Section 10(a) provides: "The Board is empowered
... to prevent any persons from engaging in any unfair labor
practice affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected
by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been
or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise."' How-
ever, it is particularly important to notice that the act does not
require, with one exception, 2 that the Board always exercise its
jurisdictional power; it merely gives the Board exclusive juris-
diction when the Board does decide to exercise it.
Prior to the case of Spielberg Mfg. Co. & Harold Gruenberg,3
the Board apparently had not formulated any comprehensive
criteria by which it would determine whether to accept an arbi-
tration award as a binding settlement of the dispute presented
as an unfair labor practice. In that case four strikers, dis-
charged for their conduct during the strike, were refused re-
instatment by an arbitration award which the union, company,
and discharged strikers had agreed was to be binding. The dis-
charged strikers were represented by counsel, and three of the
four were present during the arbitration. Subsequently these
discharged strikers filed unfair labor practice charges. The
Board dismissed the complaint and accepted the arbitration
award as binding. In doing this the Board enumerated the
criteria to be met before the Board would defer the exercise of
its jurisdiction to an arbitration award. The three criteria are:
1. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1947).
2. Labor Management Relations Disclosure Act § 701 (1959).
3. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
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